 |
| Photo by SpaceX on Unsplash |
I. SPACE GOVERNANCE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARISATION
Space governance
refers to the framework of international laws, norms, and institutions that
regulate and coordinate human activities in outer space. It encompasses various
issues, including satellite regulation and orbital slots, space debris and
sustainability, militarisation and security in space, commercial activities
such as space tourism and mining, and liability for damage caused by space
objects. To
understand the entire issue, it is essential to grasp the subtle yet
significant distinction between the militarisation and weaponisation of space,
which are often used interchangeably. The "Militarisation" of space
refers to the use of outer space for military purposes (regardless of its
hostile or non-hostile nature), including intelligence gathering, communications,
and targeting. Whereas the "Weponisation" of space involves the
actual placement or use of weapons in or from space, it opens a potential
battlefield in the future. As various countries
deploy military and dual-use satellites
(satellites that are used for both civilian
and military purposes) and develop anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), which are
used to disable, damage, or destroy satellites in space, space governance
becomes increasingly complex.
II. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ITS LEGAL GAPS
The Outer Space
Treaty (1967)[1],
a primary source of international space law in this respect, was developed
during the Cold War era. However, due to the rapid evolution of technology and the
introduction of new facets, such as space tourism and space mining, its
language has become somewhat outdated. These
limitations also stem from the fact that the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated
in the 1960s, when space activities were almost entirely state-led and
non-commercial in nature. It lacks basic legal definitions in the treaty
for terms such as 'outer space' and 'space
debris'. Article II of the treaty prohibits national
appropriation of any celestial body. Still, there is a debate on whether the extraction of resources from such bodies can
be considered as appropriation. Moreover, Article IV bans the placement of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear weapons, but it is entirely silent about conventional weapons. This absence has
created legal and strategic ambiguity, which raises the risk of conflict
escalation, debris-generating military actions,
and long-term threats to the peaceful use of outer space.
III. CONGESTED ORBITS, SPACE DEBRIS, AND EMERGING SECURITY RISKS
According to the latest data from various sources, there are approximately 14,000 active satellites and 3,000 inactive satellites currently orbiting Earth. The large number of satellites is primarily due to the rapid expansion of commercial companies in orbit. SpaceX's Starlink constellation comprises a significant portion, accounting for approximately 9,400 of the active satellites in orbit[2]. Large-scale internet services launch thousands of small, standardised satellites, as they are cheaper and improve accessibility. However, this increases the likelihood of satellite collisions, which would in turn produce orbiting fragments. Each of these fragments would increase the probability of further collisions, leading to the growth of a belt of debris around the Earth. This is known as the Kessler Syndrome[3], a phenomenon in which the amount of space debris in orbit around Earth reaches a point where it creates an increasing amount of debris, causing significant problems for satellites, astronauts, and mission planners.
Recently, on 9 December 2025,
a newly launched Chinese satellite passed within 200 meters of a Starlink
satellite in low Earth orbit due to inadequate trajectory coordination between
the operators[4]. This
highlights the significant gaps in space traffic management and governance as
orbit becomes crowded, and how the lack of shared data and international
protocols increases collision risk and debris generation. Although existing
space law encourages cooperation and information sharing, these obligations remain
largely voluntary and lack effective enforcement mechanisms. In September 2025, Germany announced
that it would invest $41 billion in military space capabilities by 2030,
demonstrating the country's commitment to enhancing its technological
independence and ability to protect its assets in orbit amid increasing
militarisation of outer space. It outlined plans for a comprehensive military
space security architecture, including hardened systems against attacks,
improved orbital surveillance through radars and telescopes, future
"guardian satellites", and Germany's own military satellite
operations centre within the Bundeswehr Space Command, which marked a
departure from its current space policies, which were explicitly defensive[5].
A new report published by the Centre
for Security Studies at ETH Zürich revealed that more than 237 cyber operations
targeted space infrastructure between January 2023 and July 2025[6] These
examples demonstrate that there is no global authority that enforces space
traffic management or debris management, and the vulnerabilities of these
critical infrastructures. States are actively preparing for warfighting in
space, and cyber threats to space infrastructure create a new dimension of
conflict not covered by traditional space laws. Space is no longer limited to
scientific exploration as it now affects national security, communications,
navigation, climate monitoring, and disaster management. The growing
militarisation of space by major powers makes this a core issue in global governance.
IV. COMMERCIALISATION, FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE, AND THE NEED FOR GLOBAL CONCENSUS
Moreover, as commercial actors and
private launches increase, questions of liability, regulation, and conflict
prevention will only intensify. Due to the shortcomings not only of the Outer
Space Treaty (1967) but also of subsequent instruments such as the Rescue
Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention
(1975) and the Moon Agreement (1979), which together build upon and
operationalize its principles, several states, including the United States,
Luxembourg, the UAE and Japan have enacted domestic legislation regulating
space resource extraction. For example, ispace, a global lunar resource
development company, utilised a license granted by the Japanese government
under Japan's Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration
and Development of Space Resources (Space Resources Act) to enter into a
contract to transfer ownership of lunar regolith to NASA in 2024[7].
Currently, outer space is governed
not by a single authority, but by a fragmented mix of outdated treaties and
unilateral national laws. Although several states have enacted domestic laws
permitting space resource activities, these unilateral measures do not by
themselves create new rules of customary international law. Without widespread
and consistent state practice accompanied by a belief that such conduct is
legally permitted, national legislation remains politically significant but
legally fragmented. In a domain as global and fragile as outer space,
governance cannot be shaped by a handful of spacefaring nations acting alone,
since all states, regardless of their level of development, have an equal stake
in a global common (a domain or resource which is governed by shared legal
responsibility, and no State can claim it). What is needed instead is a renewed
international consensus on how space resources should be explored and used,
guided by principles of sustainability, accountability, and security.
The Outer Space Treaty, despite its
limitations, remains a principled foundation for this effort. Its vision of
outer space as the "province of all mankind" rejects the idea that
orbit and celestial bodies should become mere arenas for profit or power.
Rather than abandoning this framework, the international community must build
upon it, adapting its principles to contemporary realities. Only through
cooperative rule-making can outer space be governed not as a battlefield or a
marketplace, but as a shared domain for the benefit of all humanity.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal to the author. Publication on Nib & Notion does not imply endorsement. Nib & Notion assumes no liability for reliance on the information provided.
About the Author
ISHI SWARAJ
Law Student at SLS Pune
LinkedIn
[1] G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/21/2222 (Dec. 19, 1966), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf.
[2] Jonathan McDowell, Satellite and Debris
Population, Planet4589.org (updated Jan. 2, 2026), https://planet4589.org/space/stats/active.html.
[3] Mike Wall, Kessler Syndrome and the Space
Debris Problem, Space.com (July 14, 2022), https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris.
[4] Mike Wall, Spacecraft from Chinese Launch
Nearly Slammed into Starlink Satellite, Space.com (Dec. 13, 2025), https://www.space.com/space-exploration/satellites/spacecraft-from-chinese-launch-nearly-slammed-into-starlink-satellite-spacex-says.
[5] Theresa Hitchens, German Military to
Invest $41B in Space Capabilities, Breaking Defense (Sept. 25, 2025), https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/german-military-to-invest-41b-in-space-capabilities/.
[6] Clémence Poirier, Breaking the Final
Frontier: Cyber Operations Against the Space Sector, Center for Security
Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich (Nov. 24, 2025), https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2025/11/breaking-the-final-frontier-cyber-operations-against-the-space-sector.html.
[7] ispace, Inc., ispace Obtains License to
Conduct Lunar Surface Operations from Japanese Government for Second Mission
(Dec. 17, 2024), https://ispace-inc.com/news-en/?p=6558.
0 Comments