STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU 2025 INSC 481 (CASE ANALYSIS)

Nib & Notion

John Stuart Mill, in his work, Considerations on Representative Government, has argued that it is next to impossible for free institutions to sustain in a country that encompasses many nationalities.[1] In fact, considering the humongous and vast ethnic, linguistic, and caste diversity in India, many Western observers predicted that due to high poverty, illiteracy, the entrenched caste system, and ethnic fragmentation, the fall of Indian Democracy was imminent.[2] It is indeed a deviant case and a leading contemporary exception because it defiantly counters most of the well-established democratic theories around the world. This political phenomenon is more perplexing when we observe the cases around its border. Be it a military-established hoax democracy in Pakistan or Bangladesh, or one of the most unstable democratic governments of Nepal. India has proven that with a well-drafted constitution and by marking the powers and functions of various institutions of the State and Union government, the democratic principles not only survive in the country, but also flourish over a period of time. 

One of the most apparent reasons behind such exceptional success can be manifested by India's unique federal structure. Known by its many names, such as quasi-federal structure, federalism with a strong centralising tendency, holding together federalism, or, in the contemporary context, where Centre and States are encouraged to work collaboratively, a cooperative federalism. It is a system of government that has both federal and unitary features. The power between the centre and the state is divided through the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, but the centre often enjoys a stronghold through direct and indirect control. The direct control is where the centre can legislate on the state subjects under certain conditions, and the indirect way to influence and control the state legislature is through its representative, the Governor of the State. 

The tussle between the State and the Governor has been reported in the past by various Indian States and Union Territories, such as New Delhi, West Bengal, and Kerala. In fact, the allegations were made by such States and Union Territories regarding the undue use of this constitutional position for influencing and stalling the normal business of the States and Union Territories ruled by the opposition. One such issue reached the Apex Court, and the following judgment was passed to resolve such a conflict, but it has further ignited this ever-happening issue in the contemporary National Issue. 

IRAC SUMMARY

ISSUE

This case shows a high-stakes constitutional conflict between the elected government of Tamil Nadu and its Governor. The central issues of this dispute between two constitutionally backed bodies were whether the Governor had acted within the scope of his power and functions under the constitution when he:

  1. Indefinitely withheld assent to 12 bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and reserved 10 of them for presidential consideration even after they were re-presented to him by the legislature. 
  2. Failed to prosecute a public servant accused of corruption despite the State Cabinet's recommendations. 
  3. Delayed the files for the premature release of prisoners as recommended by the Council of Ministers. 
  4. Delayed the appointment of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC).
  5. Interfered with ministerial portfolios and appointments. 

These issues can be rephrased into constitutional questions for more clarity. 

  1. Does Article 200 of the Constitution allow the Governor to withhold or indefinitely delay assent to the bills passed by the State Legislature? (Pocket Veto)
  2. Does the Governor have the power to reserve the bills for the president after it is repassed by the legislature under the first proviso to Article 200?
  3. Is there any time limit for the Governor to act on bills, sanctions, or a clemency petition, for that matter?
  4. To what extent is the Governor bound by the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers under Articles 163, 200, 316, and 161?
  5. Is the Governor's discretion in such matters subject to judicial review?

RULE

The Court drew its analysis from the constitutional text, Constituent Assembly debates, historical reports, and case law. 

1. GOVERNOR'S ROLE UNDER ARTICLES 163, 200, AND 201

  • Article 200[3] empowers the Governor to give assent to a bill, or withhold the assent, or reserve the bill for Presidential consideration. 

The first proviso states that when the assent is withheld, the Governor must return the bill with a message for reconsideration. Further, if the bill is repassed by the state legislature with or without amendment and presented to the Governor again, he/she is bound to give his or her assent.  

  • Article 201[4] outlines the President's role when bills are reserved. 
  • Article 163(1)[5] provides that the role of the Council of Ministers is to aid and advise the Governor in exercising his functions. 

This rule comes with an exception that the Governor may act in his own discretion when the Constitution expressly provides or necessarily implies. 

Clause 2 of Article 163[6] further states that if a question arises about whether a matter falls within the discretionary power or not, the Governor's decision is final.

Clause 3 of Article 163[7] protects the advice of the Council of Ministers to the Governor from the enquiry by any court. 

2.      TIMEFRAME FOR DECISION-MAKING 

  • The Constitution of India doesn't provide any timeline for Governor’s actions. However, phrases like "as soon as possible" in Article 200 infers that decisions must be taken without undue delay. 
  • The Supreme Court in A.G. Perarivalan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022[8], had established that gubernatorial inaction is subject to judicial review. 

3.      AID AND ADVISE PRINCIPLE 

  • The Supreme Court has time and again clarified that the Governor is a Constitutional head of the state government and the real executive power vests in the Council of Ministers. Further, the discretionary power of the Governor is minimal. (Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974[9]; Naban Rebia v Deputy Speaker, 2016[10]) 

4.      JUDICIAL REVIEW 

  • The Governor's actions are not exempted from Judicial Review,  in case his/her actions are proven mala fide, unconstitutional, or beyond the scope of permitted discretion. 

5.      RELEVANT PRECEDENTS AND COMMISSION 

  • State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to Governor of Punjab (2023[11]); The court has clarified that once a Governor withholds assent, he must follow the procedure mentioned in Article 200, and he/she cannot indefinitely sit on bills. 
  • Sarkaria Commission (1988)[12] and Punchhi Commission[13] (2010): These commissions recommended limiting gubernatorial discretion to avoid misuse of power by the central government and to uphold the principle of federalism in India.
  • Internationally, countries like the UK, Canada, and Australia affirm the principle that heads of state must act on ministerial advice. 

APPLICATION/ANALYSIS 

1. ASSENT TO BILLS 

Between 2020 and 2023, the Tamil Nadu Assembly had passed 12 bills, of which 10 were withheld by the Governor and were reserved for the President after being repassed by the Assembly.

  • The court held that the Governor's inaction amounted to a 'pocket veto', which is not a creation of the Indian Constitution. The Governor cannot just sit on the bill indefinitely, as is the practice in the United States of America. 
  • By not passing the bill after reconsideration of the Assembly, the Governor has circumvented the first proviso of Article 200. Once the Assembly repasses the bill, the only constitutional option is to give his assent, not otherwise. 
  • The President's refusal of assent to seven bills and the pendency of two underscored the damage to the legislative process. 

Thus, the Governor's actions were held unconstitutional and violative of democratic accountability. 

2. SANCTION FOR CORRUPTION PROSECUTION 

The sanction in corruption cases involving former ministers (e.g., K.C. Veeramani, Vijayabhaskar, B.V. Ramana) was delayed by the Governor despite Cabinet recommendations for it. 

  •  The court reiterates that the Governor's sanctioning power under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not discretionary. Similar to the President, he has to act on ministerial advice. 
  • The action of delaying the sanction till the writ petition was filed shows a mala fide inaction from the Governor's side. 
  • The Court also clarified that the Governor's demand for investigation reports and other queries exceeded his constitutional role. 

3. PREMATURE RELEASE OF PRISONERS 

53 cases of remission forwarded by the State Cabinet were either delayed or referred to the President for years. 

  • The Court reiterated its landmark ruling in Epuru Sudhakar v. State of A.P.[14] and Perarivalan[15] that the Governor is bound by the Cabinet's advice under Article 161 of the Constitution.
  • The inexplicable delay in the remission petition had violated the prisoner's life and liberty and therefore was unconstitutional. 
  • The Governor's action of referring the remission cases to the President lacked any constitutional backing and therefore was struck down. 

4. APPOINTMENTS TO TNPSC 

The Governor had inquired about the candidacy's suitability of TNPSC civil servants and returned the files without approval.

  • The Court held that appointments of constitutional commissions, like that of TNPSC, fall within the ambit of the executive under Article 316[16]. 
  • The Governor cannot delay these appointments passed by the Cabinet on the grounds of transparency. 
  • Such interference often undermines the efficiency of public administration. 

5.  MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS AND DISMISSALS 

The Suo motu attempt of the Governor to dismiss Minister Senthil Balaji, who was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate and was placed in Judicial Custody by the Court and later refused to swear in Dr K. Ponmudy despite the Supreme Court suspension of his conviction. 

  • The Court held that the Governor's actions were contrary to constitutional morality and judicial discipline.
  • Ministerial appointments and dismissals are within the power of the Chief Minister under Articles 163 and 164, subject only to constitutional disqualification. 
  • The Governor had acted beyond its constitutional authority and in contempt of the Court's order.

CONCLUSION 

The Supreme Court, in this landmark judgement, has reaffirmed the intention of the constitutional framers of the gubernatorial position as a constitutional head, not an executive rival. The Court has highlighted the importance of keeping synchrony between the State and Centre by respecting each other's domain and autonomy. However, this judgment is not free from the criticism it is getting from the intellectuals and politicians nationwide. The former Vice President of India, Jagdeep Dhankhar, being one of the staunch opponents of judicial overreach, had criticised the judgment, stating that "India was never meant to have a democracy where judges function as lawmakers, the Executive, and as a super parliament[17]". Subsequently, instead, the Union government referred 14 constitutional questions to the President of India, including the interpretation of Articles 200 and 201 related to Governors and the President's power and function, which, interestingly, have already been answered by the Supreme Court in this judgment delivered on 8 April 2025. The opponents of this step are already terming this as an appeal in disguise[18]. No matter where this issue will go in future, one thing is clear: this judgment has stirred the discourse on the use of Article 142[19] by the Supreme Court of India to do complete justice, the fine line between judicial activism & overreach, and most importantly, the separation of powers, which forms the backbone of the Indian democracy. The settlement of these issues is yet to be seen, but whatever the result would be, it is going to reshape our views on how we look at and perceive the federal structure of India. 


About the Authors

Basant Kumar Gupta 

Student, Symbiosis Law School, Pune

Founder (Nib & Notion)

LinkedIn

Neeraja Chavan

Student, Symbiosis Law School, Pune

LinkedIn

 



[1] John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government: Chapter XVI, “Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government (on file with University of Texas, Laits PolTheory), https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/mill/repgov/repgov.c16.html.

[2] Author(s), Title of Chapter, in India's Democratic Longevity and Its Troubled Trajectory (Oxford Univ. Press 2022), https://academic.oup.com/book/43904/chapter/370126691.

[3] Ind. Const. art. 200.

[4] Ind. Const. art. 201.

[5] Ind. Const. art. 163, §1.

[6] Ind. Const. art. 163, §2.

[7] Ind. Const. art. 163, §3.

[8] A.G. Perarivalan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2022) 7 S.C.R. 1048, Criminal Appeal Nos. 833–834 of 2022 (India).

[9] Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 (India).

[10] Naban Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Assam Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 (India).

[11] State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 384, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1224 of 2023 (India).

[12] Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) (India).

[13] Punchhi Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (2010) (India).

[14] Epuru Sudhakar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8 SCC 161 (India).

[15] A.G. Perarivalan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2022) 7 S.C.R. 1048, Criminal Appeal Nos. 833–834 of 2022 (India).

[16] Ind. Const. art. 316.

[17] Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar, No Authority Above Parliament, The Indian Express (Apr. 22, 2025), https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/v-p-jagdeep-dhankhar-parliament-previous-run-ins-the-judiciary-9959060/.

[18] "Appeal In Disguise": Tamil Nadu To Top Court On Presidential Reference On Governor's Powers, NDTV (July 29, 2025), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/appeal-in-disguise-tamil-nadu-to-top-court-on-presidential-reference-on-governors-power-8969902.

[19] Ind. Const. art. 142.

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